The Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) 
INTRODUCTION
T RANSPARENCY is a poor label for a rich subject. The truth is that no single observer will ever have complete information about even modesty complex institutions, and no institution is ever completely unknown. Instead, information tends to be dispersed among many different actors, and important aspects of an institution are always revealed to some set of 1 Thus, whatever the appropriate political rhetoric might be, there is little analytic value in demands for government operations that are either totally transparent or totally secret. Neither will happen. Accordingly, the realistic goals for "transparency" advocates are often obscure, even though the slogan implicates crucial questions of information policy. 2 As a practical matter, information policy is a series of intermediate choices along several dimensions. These dimensions include the content of information to be distributed; the manner of its distribution; the class of information insiders who should have access; the strategy, in law or elsewhere, for implementing these choices; and the resources appropriately devoted to the implementation strategy. Making sound choices on these dimensions is often difficult. The task may embed the decision-maker within conflicts that are without obvious solutions.
3 And a normative goal, or a reconciliation of competing goals, is required to make intelligent choices. Information policy lacks direction without a sense of value. This essay is an attempt to better understand the plausible goals of information policy in one context: judicial operations. It is commonly felt that public access to information about the judiciary is desirable-or that competing interests are sometimes threatened-but these impressions will not resolve live disputes. At the least, the objective for information access ought to be more concrete.
Progress can be made by exploring the relationship between demands for judicial transparency and renewed scholarly efforts to explain judicial behavior. A new wave of Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) is assembling novel datasets and applying innovative statistical methods to test a variety of possible influences on judicial decisions-precedent, ideology, attorney quality, strategic considerations and others. As those models of judicial behavior become more convincing, the ability to predict future judicial decisions should also improve.
And predictability might exhaust the most persuasive claims for "judicial transparency." Perhaps the valid interests of transparency advocates would be entirely satisfied with an information policy designed to render judicial decisions predictable. 4 This angle of analysis thus suggests two inquiries:
(1) what an age of predictable judicial behavior would look like, and (2) whether there are convincing arguments for judicial transparency beyond what is needed to predict judicial decisions. After Part I briefly reviews ELS efforts to understand judicial behavior, Part II imagines a world of perfectly predictable judicial decisions. This environment, although unstable, would leave almost no litigation to scrutinize. Dramatically higher settlement rates occasioned by predictability would be at odds with actually observing the behavior in question. Part III returns to the real world and the question ofjudicial transparency's plausible goals. Those goals are clustered into instrumental and intrinsic arguments for information access. The instrumental arguments involve court monitoring, institutional reform, planning, and legitimacy in dispute resolution. The intrinsic arguments involve the consumption or entertainment value of information associated with certain legal proceedings.
Despite the diversity of these objectives, most would be served by orienting the judiciary's information policy toward the needs of prediction. A principal exception involves the intrinsic value of information access. The data necessary for accurate prediction almost certainly would not match academic or popular demands for visible legal proceedings; as Part II suggests, greater predictability need not advance-and might even thwart-an audience's opportunity to "consume" adjudication. For some, that is no shortcoming.
5 But how to treat the consumption value of public access is, I shall suggest, a contestable and unappreciated normative choice for information policy.
4. In highlighting the potential of the PACER electronic docket, Lynn LoPucki suggested that the needs of reliable prediction models should drive the judiciary's information policy. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court Transparency 3, 9, 71-72 (Mar. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104744 (urging researcher-friendly PDF file formats and abolition of PACER user fees). Some might think that access to such an extent is too costly or risky, and LoPucki attempted to address these concerns. See, e.g., id. at 3-5, 58 (distinguishing interest in avoiding data aggregation from "privacy in the traditional sense," yet recognizing that inconvenience effectively diminishes information access for scholars). My conclusions are usually compatible with LoPucki's. But I focus on whether a prediction-orientated information policy would omit anything valuable, whether or not countervailing interests recommend trimming back the prediction objective, and I might differ with him on the consequences of predictable judicial behavior. Our differences are not easily restated because we are asking somewhat different questions. A particularly bold claim is that a Justice's ideology influences voting behavior but precedent does not. 14 The more modest, general sense of the research is that the policy preferences of the Justices are important to their votes on the merits in many cases, even if these preferences cannot account for all voting behavior.
Open questions remain, of course. The standard proxies for judicial ideology are fairly crude. Options for such proxies include the political party of the nominating president, newspaper editorials' characterization of the Justice during the appointment process or coalitions of Justices identified according to voting patterns on the bench. 15 It also seems that ideology is somewhat unpredictable over long periods of time. In any event, data on past judicial behavior can be used to build prediction models. Consider a recent effort to predict Supreme Court decisions. Using six variables, Andrew Martin and his colleagues designed a statistical model for predicting case outcomes and individual voting behavior. 19 The modelers generated classification trees to predict unanimous decisions and, for the remaining cases, the votes of each Justice based on their votes in past cases. Those past cases had been coded according to issue area, identity of petitioner and respondent, identity of the court below, liberal or conservative lower court decision, and whether the petitioner made a constitutional claim. Sometimes it turned out that one Justice's vote figured into the classification tree of another Justice.
Like every model, this one has weaknesses. For example, it cannot handle newly appointed Justices, does not say anything about the content of written opinions, and categorizes case outcomes as simply "affirm" or "reverse."
20 Nevertheless, the model performed fairly well within its con- of observable variables involving the participating judge, the litigants, the quality of the lawyers involved, the claims and evidence at issue, and/or other factors. One needs only the model and the data on which it operates to predict judicial decisions with unsurpassable confidence. 29 From one perspective, the Ultimate Equation brings us to the apex of court transparency. Foreseeing judicial decisions perfectly is akin to witnessing the decisions as they happen. Even better, the Equation's variables indicate what actually influences judicial conduct. Such a model might be more informative than, say, the most reliable prediction market.
3 0 These markets can be designed to both aggregate information about judicial behavior and point us toward the most likely outcome in particular cases. But it seems more difficult for prediction markets to explain themselves-that is, to provide observers with accurate reasons for one outcome over another. Statistical models can assist us with those answers. For reasons suggested in Part III, below, knowing the actual influences on judicial decisions might be important to judicial transparency advocates even apart from its contribution to accurate prediction.
It is true that the Equation might operate with mere proxies for these actual influences and yet generate accurate outcome predictions. Subjective and unconscious motives are notoriously difficult to unveil. As well, the specified variables could be the result of still other forces to which we should pay attention: a statistical model might gain accuracy by including the race, sex, age, and income of the parties, lawyers, and judges participating in a case without revealing precisely why or how those attributes influence decision-making. Useful variables will not necessarily map out decision dynamics.
Nevertheless, specification of the Ultimate Equation's variables would mark movement toward predicting and understanding judicial behavior. In this world, outsiders need not rely on their intuitions about judges; such intuitions can be clouded by expectations or normative commitments. Nor must outsiders depend upon explanations provided byjudges. Cynics can disregard the public declarations of ajudge as convenient window-dressing.
3 1 Furthermore, if judges are anything like ordinary human 29. As described, this Equation would not predict jury decisions. I set this issue aside, without suggesting that empiricists will be forever mystified by juries even as they make progress on judges. An Ultimate Equation for juries seems equally (im)plausible. The judge/jury distinction is a reminder, however, that many of us have particular expectations for the judicial role, and that predictable judicial behavior might not permit these expectations to be satisfied. This question is taken up below. The relationship between prediction and transparency is actually more complicated than this discussion suggests. The two objectives might not be fully interchangeable. Understanding why takes additional work. We can begin by considering what adjudication might look like under the condition of perfect prediction, and what might be required to perpetuate that condition.
A. The End of Adjudication?
One might suppose that perfect prediction ofjudicial behavior would leave us with nothing to see. Our court systems depend heavily on litigants to initiate the process, and an intelligible view of litigation is that it thrives on uncertain outcomes. Otherwise, parties can settle. 33 If party A wants something from party B, if each would suffer litigation costs by pursuing a lawsuit, if settlement can deliver the same result for the parties as adjudication, and if each party is confident that a court judgment would be enforced, then A and B are each better off knowing the judicial outcome in advance and settling the matter in light of that knowledge. Negotiating a settlement without judicial assistance must be comparatively less expensive for this logic to work, but often it is. In these situations settlement looks superior to litigation from the angle of narrow self-interest. Litigating would add no useful information about the likely outcome. True, the predictability of adjudication might encourage more demands for redress. Perhaps injured parties with legally valid claims do not assert them today because they are not aware of judicial receptivity or because of litigation costs. 34 It is also possible that, in an environment of extreme legal certainty, recklessness allegations and punitive damages demands would rise as a proportion of all allegations, and that defenses akin to qualified immunity would fade. 35 But any increase in the number of 32. Its breadth also avoids some of the objections to more selective use of "actuarial" tools. Uncertainty about final judgments is not the only fuel for litigation, of course. Another hindrance to settlement might be that party A cannot evaluate the strength of her position without using the tools of court-supported discovery to extract information withheld by party B. But if the available model of judicial behavior is as perfect as we can imagine, even this uncertainty should not be a barrier to early settlement. The Equation ought to predict how a court would resolve any discovery dispute, thereby allowing the parties to know which information must be disclosed without filing suit.
The Ultimate Equation seems to be at war with the existence of adjudication.
Yet other considerations suggest that adjudication would persist. First of all, parties might find a measure of intrinsic or consumption value in litigation. Some parties derive pleasure or satisfaction from fighting their way through the litigation process. This remains true after accounting for those with a desire to harm their opponents with the pain of litigation regardless of the merits, along with those for whom a loss in court is a win somewhere else. Even apart from cases in which success on the merits is unimportant, a post-uncertainty age might still include litigation. The notion of an ethically pure vindication in court might not be a complete myth. Furthermore, there is a line of scholarship that supports participatory procedure. These studies contend that parties feel more satisfied with dispute resolution, perhaps regardless of the outcome, if they believe they have an adequate opportunity to voice their position to the decision-maker. 38 Although predictability and revelation of actual influences on judicial decisions could reduce such desire for voice and recognition, maybe the cold mathematics of an equation would not eliminate this demand.
might not believe detection is certain, while remedies might not be optimally calibrated for deterrence. Obviously, these assertions are controversial. Feelings of vindication or acceptance can move someone only so far in the teeth of litigation burdens. There are, however, additional reasons for litigation to survive. For any statistical model to eliminate uncertainty in adjudication, that model would have to be radically available. Anyone contemplating a court fight would have to enjoy access to the model and the data on which it operates in order to ensure settlement through certainty. There is no guarantee that cutting-edge ELS modeling would be so available or user-friendly. We can assume away this access problem in a continuing spirit of fantasy. But, for those who labor in the academic field of transparency, practical availability of information is a persistent and understandable concern.
A final barrier to zero litigation cannot be evaded without extraordinary imagination. The difficulty is that the absence of adjudication is in tension with its accurate prediction. Any statistical model of behavior is likely to degrade without new observations. ELS models rest heavily on data about past behavior. Good models do rely on sound theories to make sense, but the raw material for a reliable prediction is evidence from the past. Modelers use what they can discover about the past to sketch a picture of causal influences that hopefully matches the dynamics of future situations. However much faith one places in this method of prognostication, its dependence on a matching past is inescapable.
If the relevant data set is frozen while decision dynamics and relevant case attributes are not, observers should begin to lose confidence in the model. Any number of changes can undermine reliability. An intuitive example is the appointment of new judges to the bench.
3 9 Other disrupting influences on the decision environment are more difficult to specify, but they certainly exist. Perhaps the operating Equation was built on the assumption of a particular mix of case types, but social, economic, political, or technological change alters that mix and produces novel disputes that the Equation cannot process. Thus, it might be that a fantasy age of perfect prediction is self-immolating. The Ultimate Equation would eviscerate our reasons to litigate and, in so doing, undercut its own reliability. We might imagine an even better Equation that would not only predict behavior of sitting judges within their existing decision environment, but also predict retirements, deaths, new appointments, new case mixes, and everything else relevant to judicial decision. At this stage, however, the heuristic value of fantasy is rapidly declining.
Adding a little optimism (or rationalism) might change the conclusion. Informed observers will understand the extent to which our "modest" Equation has degraded. They will be able to calculate an increasing margin of error. Given that margin-which amounts to a degree of uncertainty aboutjudicial behavior-some will be drawn back into the litigation 39. Assuming a new judge's behavior on the bench cannot be predicted by pre-appointment behavior.
process. Some number of cases will be filed, fresh observations ofjudicial behavior will be made and the Equation will be updated. There is no assurance that such dynamics will be adequate; perhaps there will be an insufficient amount of litigation, or a suboptimal distribution of case types, such that the Equation will remain imperfect almost as soon as it is constructed. In that case, litigation might be subsidized or another fix might be implemented to push the model back toward perfection. This is not to say that the Equation or the demise of adjudication has only advantages. One might prefer that the development and announcement of law take place in a public setting with judges presiding. Judicial policymaking is not always valued today, but there are stalwarts who consider the institutional features of courts conducive to a meritorious style of reasoning, 40 and others who portray judicial intervention as part of a healthy dialogue on values.
4 1 Settlement facilitated by statistical modeling might not satisfy this demand; in fact it would be Owen Fiss's nightmare.4 2 A related problem is the loss of learning from adjudication. Working through numerous disputes provides information to adjudicators about law and human affairs, and thus allows them to modify both their sense of good judgment and the optimal operation of the judicial system. "[I]f the Court has fallen into predictably routine patterns of decision," Fuller suggested, "it might be in the public interest for a good lawyer to step in and shake them loose from their bureaucratic rigidities." 43 To be sure, this argument is easy to overstate. The salience of litigated cases can skew judicial perception of the world outside the courtroom.
4 4 Experience might lead to callousness that prevents a healthy assessment of real harms. Moreover, some evidence exists for the proposition that "experts" overestimate their own competence. 4 5 Nevertheless, we might sensibly conclude that experience with adjudication has net positive effects. Depressing the level of adjudication too far would threaten that learning effect. 
plainly more trouble than it is worth. Every model will have a margin of error, a proxy, an omitted variable, and a collapse in the face of unanticipated shocks to previously stable systems. We are not going to achieve perfect prediction of judicial behavior any more than stock market prices will become totally foreseeable. Anyway, information policy is the present concern. But on that score, we have made progress. It seems that an age of prediction would witness far less litigation even if adjudication would never disappear. If so, predictability bears intriguing relationships to transparency and adjudication: predictability is allied with transparency, in that prediction offers an understanding of how and why judges act, yet predictability is inversely related to actual adjudication, which might be troubling depending on the preferred goals for "transparency."
B. Toward the Equation
Before investigating these relationships more carefully, it is worth underscoring some conditions under which advancement toward an Ultimate Equation is possible. Empirical models of judicial behavior will not operate reliably without maintenance and the right environment. One requirement was indicated above: some minimum level of actual adjudication. A second requirement is equally important and not limited to daydreams in which a leading worry is the disappearance of litigation. It involves data, and it is a concern for today's equations along with more sophisticated successors. All statistical models need data to be tested and to generate predictions. Their equations cannot produce any hypothesis about past judicial behavior, nor suggest anything about future behavior, without the information called for by their variables.
This point deserves to be emphasized because it is closely linked to one possible orientation for information policy. Those who value empirically grounded models of judicial behavior will prefer ongoing access to the data made relevant by those models. Even further, this class of "quants" will prefer access to a wider range of information in order to perfect and update their equations. Confidence in these models increases by testing alternatives that would disrupt conventional wisdom. To some extent, this means gathering data on factors we presently think irrelevant. A series of studies indicating, for instance, that precedent does not serirary restraining orders); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 n.20 (1988) (regarding search warrants). To the extent prior court approval is required for a desired course of action, it is not clear how the system should adjust to the demanding party's ability to perfectly predict this approval. Second, the mix of cases filed as the Equation becomes less reliable might be very different from the mix of cases filed under today's condition of more serious uncertainty. We might expect those with the most at stake, not necessarily those with the strongest arguments, to begin filing suit at the first hint of the Equation's imperfection. The Equation would have to account for this skew, and observers would have to be careful not to be misled about the nature of law or legal disputes. Of course we already have this risk of misapprehension today.
ously influence Supreme Court outcomes would not lead every responsible ELS scholar to ignore data on precedent in all future efforts at modeling. This is not only an issue of data being theoretically available. ELS supporters should want practical access to data for those with empirical skills, at a low cost. Functionally, there is no difference between data that is prohibitively costly to collect and data that is formally illegal to disseminate. Depending on the penalties and costs, the former might be more crippling to information needs than the latter.
Hence the information policy implications are relatively concrete once we commit to fueling ELS studies of judicial behavior. In fact, the entire information policy for the judiciary could be designed solely to maximize scholars' ability to explain and predict the decisions of judges. Perhaps the result would be too invasive or disruptive. It does seem unlikely that official policy will expose all information about the lifestyles of federal judges outside the courthouse, even if that data could greatly improve the predictive power of ELS models, or that Congress will mandate random case assignment across current jurisdictional boundaries in the service of ELS scholarship. And there remain privacy arguments to be addressed involving parties, witnesses, jurors, and even lawyers.
So we cannot know without much more debate whether a predictionoriented information policy would expose too much. But can we at least deny that it would expose too little? Would the data requirements for progress toward predictability exhaust the normative claims to public information about the judiciary?
III. PREDICTION AND TRANSPARENCY
In the real world, judicial behavior will never be perfectly predictable. Even if attention is narrowed to a particular slice of judicial decision-making, such as motions to dismiss after Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly 4 7 or criminal sentencing after United States v. Booker, 48 prediction error will persist. The finest model will either incorrectly specify variables, or not quite understand their actual relationship, or depend on imperfect proxies for data that we want but cannot feasibly acquire, or fail to account for a meaningful change in the decision environment. Indeed, these imperfections could all be present in a statistical model that performs exceptionally well. The model might use ordinarily dependable proxies without explaining the underlying mechanisms ofjudicial decision. We will continue to live with uncertainty, and judges will still have a docket to clear.
The real world is also resource-constrained. Squeezing additional information out of institutions often entails substantial costs. Policyrnakers [Vol. 53: p. 829 ought to consider the marginal benefit of additional resources devoted to information access in view of alternative uses for those resources. To be clear, the trade-offs do not always run in these directions; in many situations, secrecy is the more costly option. It takes effort to keep doors closed, or to implement effective electronic security, or to hire "plumbers" to plug information leaks. 49 Plus, the cost of information access and dissemination has changed significantly. Internet communication and the popularity of digital files make radical public access easier. But attention should be directed to the challenging contexts in which access is not costfree. An information policy worth arguing about will present controversial sacrifices.
On one side will be arguments for increasing the content of information lawfully available to interested parties, for making access to that information easy and cheap, and for the devotion of serious resources to ensure that this scope of access is guaranteed. On the other side will be understandable concerns for the projects crowded out by such commitments. There will be questions whether the costs associated with, for example, digitizing all case files in the federal courts is the best use of the required time and effort. This resistance to maximizing information access works apart from the risks of injury that can accompany information disclosure. The initial cost of information access must be added to the fear that disclosure will cause consequential harm such as privacy losses, poor deliberation, evasion of beneficial law enforcement efforts, and so on.
50
Because unfortunate trade-offs are unavoidable, thoughtful information policy turns on a sense of priority. A first step is to get clear on whether there is a goal that is essential or most urgent. This is a normative question, bounded by feasibility considerations and guided by the context ofjudicial operations. One possibility is to orient thejudiciary's information policy toward the needs of prediction. The following discussion evaluates that option against a range of potential objectives for transparency.
A. Information Values
With a little effort, typical justifications for information access can be identified, organized and briefly described. The list below is meant to be relatively uncontroversial and inclusive, and it draws upon a conventional distinction: instrumental and intrinsic values served by policy. That distinction is commonplace in the related field of free speech theory. Among the affirmative arguments for robust communication are empirical assertions that the consequence will be a working democracy or market- tested truth or some other valued result, 5 1 in addition to deontological contentions that speech is an end in itself or uniquely constitutive of personal identity. 52 The same kind of division can be made for transparency demands. Both instrumental and intrinsic values are present in the most common justifications for greater, wider, and more convenient access to information about government operations.
On the instrumental side, consider the following claims: 9 Monitoring-Prominent within transparency demands is the contention that bad conduct is more likely to take place when the relevant actors are able to shield themselves from others. Information access might facilitate monitoring by the right parties and deter misconduct 55 or otherwise result in desired behavioral change. 54 In this regard, a pro-access information policy is merely one tool for controlling behavior. It is not theoretically separable from other policy devices such as civil liability, criminal punishment, education and training, rewards for good behavior, and so forth. Thus, a focus on information policy can lead one to ignore superior methods for reaching the same objective. For present purposes, we will have to assume that information policy is the appropriate tool for positively influencing judicial behavior. e Reform-In a related vein, transparency demands might be an effort to secure information for institutional reform. Exposing information about judicial operations is the groundwork for intelligent judgment about the proper design of the court system. 55 Unlike the typical monitoring arguments, the reform justification does not necessarily presuppose a path for change. The reform justification might come with serious uncertainty about the correct purposes and design for the institution under scrutiny. In those cases, information is a transitional instrument. It can facilitate deliberation about institutional design, choices about institu- [Vol. 53: p. 829 tional objectives, or a series of decisions aimed at continuous improvement.
56
* Planning-For the next two transparency justifications, the interests of litigants and potential litigants become central. One argument is that information about judicial operations provides clarity for third-party planning. This planning function of information access can be important regardless of whether monitoring or institutional reform is needed. Potential litigants will appreciate the ability to adjust their conduct in light of the judiciary's standard operating procedure, even if that procedure is corrupt, unjust, and impossible to reform. Legal advice becomes more reliable with more information about judicial procedures and decisions, all else equal, allowing society the comfort of planning around that knowledge.
* Settlement or Legitimacy-Finally, certain categories of information might legitimize judicial operations. The concept of legitimacy includes moral judgments about when the influence of law is justified, 57 but a thinner, sociological version of legitimacy is also useful. 58 Ajudiciary's dispute resolution function is undercut when participants do not respect court decisions. One might then believe that delivering an explanation to affected parties will help them accept or endorse the outcome. 59 This disclosure can be paired with an opportunity to prevent decision-maker error through evidence and argument. It is difficult for parties to add valuable insights to a decision process when it is largely a mystery to them.
On the intrinsic value side, there are fewer arguments to review. These transparency justifications depend on the value of a given type of information standing apart from (other) consequences, and any number of normative frameworks might yield such value. As for data about the judiciary, two arguments might be separated out.
* Academic Knowledge--The first argument turns on the good associated with discovery, even when that knowledge has no use value. Professional scholars and others can experience a deeply rewarding satisfaction or euphoria from understanding how systems operate, or simply the sense that they are pursuing a foundational good. 60 There is no reason this experience does not extend to knowledge about court systems. Recognizing the phenomenon and the importance of "eureka moments" is not to argue for a hedonic trump over other considerations, of course. The thrills of knowledge could be registered as a justification for information access without granting them lexical priority over every other good. awkward, on the other hand, to defend a policy analysis that disregards the joy of knowledge.
* Popular Entertainment-Closely related is the entertainment value of litigation, both civil and criminal. As with academic knowledge, the focus here is on the potential audience for information beyond the participants in litigation. The difference is that the consumption value comes from viewing human drama instead of gathering knowledge about institutional function. Although Court TV did not endure forever as a network brand name, 6 1 there is a significant paying audience for information and images regarding a small number of conflicts that play out in thejudiciary. Policymakers might want to privilege the first kind of intrinsic argument for transparency over the second, but we should recognize this choice as contestable. Free speech theorists, no less than utilitarians, have struggled over whether to erect a hierarchy of consumption values. 6 2 No simple reason presents itself for insulating the broader category of information policy from the controversy. This list of justifications is likely incomplete, and a defensible information policy is certainly sensitive to factors in addition to the benefits of access. The list does, however, capture the rationales underlying most demands for judicial transparency. Now, the question is whether the reliable prediction of judicial behavior accords with these values-that is, whether or not prediction fits the conventional notion of transparency.
B. Prediction and Priorities
As it happens, achieving reliable prediction ofjudicial behavior serves the listed values quite well. It should be emphasized that this conclusion partly depends on precisely what data ELS models will demand: the less raw data these models need, the less likely it is that every transparency advocate will be content with a prediction-oriented policy. Nevertheless, the plausible goals of transparency would be powerfully served by a reliable prediction model, even if the model's data were never disclosed to the public. Prediction alone delivers on many dimensions of transparency, and it could be the polestar for information policy in the courts. 
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Judicial Transparency's Instrumental Value
First, empirical models of judicial behavior help solve monitoring problems. These equations allow users to not only predict judicial decisions, but also to explain them. Observers can then assess whether these explanations are normatively acceptable. If, for example, the model indicates that judges' policy preferences are driving case outcomes contrary to conventional legal argument (somehow defined), then we can evaluate whether this situation is tolerable. And if an observer already has specific conceptions about what amounts to judicial misconduct or mistake, the model becomes a monitoring tool.
It is certainly true that available equations do not fully inform us about judicial behavior. A statistical model's ability to predict outcomes at fairly high accuracy rates does not mean that it will reveal actual judicial motives in particular cases. Furthermore, today's empirical surge regarding judicial behavior rarely concentrates on efficiency. Although judicial efficiency has not been ignored, 63 academic attention is often on variables influencing outcomes, rather than the time or resources expended to reach those outcomes. Careful monitors of the judiciary should want more. Nevertheless, each advance in our ability to predict simultaneously provides the kind of insight usually demanded by monitoring arguments. Even monitoring for efficiency is partly served by existing empirical research, and it could be better served with an adjustment in focus. If costjustified, therefore, information policy can follow the needs of ELS scholars without excessive worry that core demands of monitoring will be left unmet.
A prediction-oriented policy, moreover, would not necessarily reduce public access to the details of court operations below what is available today. In fact, the result could be greater disclosure, or only a slightly different mix of content disclosed. Empirical scholars are not the only ones with an understandable claim to data, even if solely to predict judicial behavior. Lawyers might be imperfect prognosticators but many can improve their odds of giving accurate forecasts to their clients if they have better information about the court system. Forecasting is a skill for which lawyers are prized. Non-lawyers might say the same.
Thus, it could be that orienting information policy toward prediction will not seriously shrink the class of people with colorable access claims. In addition, much information presently available is relied upon by our leading statistical models. And, as indicated above, data now thought irrelevant to decisions might have to remain available in order to maintain confidence in existing models.
Finally, it seems worth noting that judicial openness can be an appropriate response to errors or misconduct uncovered by ELS models. Should a statistical model identify troubling judicial outcomes without de-63. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
pending on, say, media access to courtroom proceedings, perhaps the best way to prevent the misconduct will be to guarantee such access. The "Hawthorne Effect" of in-person observation on behavior is not a simple rule for all contexts.
6 4 So we should not rule out the possibility that certain traditional forms of live information access will influence judicial behavior differently-and in ways more desirable-than widely available statistical modeling.
It is true that what counts as desirable judicial behavior depends on an additional evaluation. One needs a normative vision for the court system, along with an understanding of observation's consequences, to choose an appropriate information policy (or an alternative method for regulating judicial behavior). But that additional step does not differentiate a prediction-oriented information policy from any other information policy. Although a prediction orientation would not certainly entail public access to courtrooms, such outcomes might be a consequence of statistical insight into the foundations of judicial conduct.
Next consider the argument that transparency facilitates institutional reform. The analysis just given speaks to this value as well. The ability to predict behavior gives would-be reformers a realistic picture of judicial outcomes. Furthermore, a reliable model of behavior helps diagnose the causes of any outcomes singled out for reform. The caveats above also apply: statistical models drawing on past behavior-that is, all statistical models-cannot predict future behavior with perfect accuracy, nor can they identify every causal factor with precision. But the important point is that institutional reform efforts are served by focusing on the needs of prediction models.
This conclusion holds for third-party planning as well. Insofar as a statistical model presents an accurate prediction ofjudicial outcomes, the model allows outsiders to understand the institution and to plan around it. Specifying causal factors serves this planning desire more strongly, but the function is served either way. Although a prediction model has to be practically available before any third party can use it for planning, this is a reason to ensure wide availability and user-friendliness of ELS models. It does not add reasons to extract information from court systems beyond what is necessary to generate reliable models.
One could pause here and question whether it is best to grant private parties and others the opportunity to predict judicial outcomes. Perhaps these actors would use the information to bend the courts to an injurious political will, or to "game the system" and achieve what might be called [Vol. 53: p. 829 unfair advantage over the law. 65 These are not irrational concerns. Yet however troubling, these risks suggest a possible constraint on the degree to which information policy ought to serve prediction-a constraint that might be satisfied by reformulating substantive law to avoid gaming and improper democratic influence, rather than avoiding a world in which everyone understands how law operates in the courts. The project in this essay is the less ambitious task of isolating positive values for transparency. In any event, the risk that information will be used to do harm is a feature of all information policies and a reason for caution. It does not seem to cut harder against a prediction-oriented policy.
The fourth goal for transparency, settlement through party acceptance, is probably more challenging to achieve with prediction. Recall that the settlement argument supposes that parties to a dispute will more likely accept the outcome if they have a sense of adequate participation. This might include an explanation from the decision-maker and an opportunity to make arguments that get heard. These objectives are served by a particular kind of information policy, one that involves individual party access to judicial explanations and argument. But a prediction-oriented policy would not clearly satisfy these demands.
True, a sophisticated prediction model may help reveal actual reasons for judicial behavior, and this could be a partial substitute for the settlement objective. Human psychology might not respond favorably to this method of explanation, however. The problem is not that statistical models would reveal morally troubling factors that influence judicial decisions. A party can have this adverse reaction from reading a judicial opinion and without any hope of enhancing prediction. Rather, the difficulty is that the settlement function might require a personal interaction that statistics cannot provide. It is not apparent how often a prediction-oriented information policy would fall short on this score. Reliable statistical models might depend on the kind of judicial opinion that also fulfills the psychological need for personal explanation. But there could well be a mismatch between prediction and party acceptance.
Judicial Transparency's Intrinsic Value
As for the intrinsic side of transparency arguments, the conclusion is less favorable. A prediction-oriented policy is a quite limited answer to those who value information about courts for its own sake. Roughly speaking, a prediction orientation partly satisfies cravings for academic knowledge but might do very little for popular entertainment.
The analysis is straightforward. Prediction-orientation plainly delivers on intellectual knowledge for one class of the curious. If the information policy for the judiciary were designed to meet the needs of those attempt- ing to reliably predict judicial behavior, large numbers of ELS scholars would be excited. This follows from the lasting and growing interest in quantitative measures ofjudicial behavior. Trained empiricists and many others have shown their commitment to understanding how courts operate in reality, and we can assume that part of this commitment comes from the value of knowing. It is not entirely clear that the elimination of this knowledge could be adequately or easily replaced by other goods.
Intrinsic value is surely not the whole story for scholars. Much of the academic's joy must be attributed to additional consequences of knowledge. Uncommon knowledge allows a person to teach or influence others, to build a certain type of reputation, to obtain employment, and so forth. Remember that the eureka moment for Archimedes happened in the service of Hiero. 66 Nor is accounting for judicial decisions the only intrinsic intellectual interest one might have in the courts. For example, the overall cost of running the court system, the speed with which cases are decided, the division of labor within the judiciary, and other topics can generate serious curiosity without a necessary link to improving predictions on case outcomes. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that a predictionoriented information policy would serve an important niche of academic curiosity about courts.
A prediction orientation performs still worse for popular entertainment. Much of the data that is useful for building reliable statistical models seems to have a rather low consumption value when it comes to human drama. Variables such as ajudge's voting record or the experience level of the lawyers are fairly disconnected from trial-related dramas. Indeed, the very existence of a reliable prediction model can undermine the entertainment value of litigation. A predictable final act is a recipe for bad drama. And as we have already discussed, predictability in litigation can lead to no litigation at all. A rough test for how an observer values litigation-as-entertainment, then, is to ask whether the observer feels a tinge of dismay at the thought of adjudication becoming predictable and then disappearing. For some, the source of this discomfort is the loss of another public arena for the confrontation of irreconcilable differences.
The point should not be overplayed. A prediction orientation might meet a substantial amount of the entertainment demand for transparency. It is common for popular interest in court proceedings to spike upward based on the identity of the litigants. Celebrity involvement in legal disputes appears to be no less attractive to mass audiences than any other celebrity conduct, and occasionally the popular interest is intense. During these episodes, a large proportion of the court's docket and proceedings 66. This is the story, anyway. SeeVITRUVIUS will be valued by substantial numbers of the public, 6 7 perhaps regardless of consequential benefits associated with water cooler chats. To the extent that ELS models of judicial behavior operate on similar raw material, a prediction-oriented access policy would incidentally serve the demand of a wider audience. Still, the reality television aspect of litigation is often not covered by a prediction-oriented information policy. There is no guarantee that a policy carefully designed to facilitate predictive models of judicial behavior would deliver video cameras in the courtroom. It is true that video images might help to explain judicial behavior by revealing information that the cold record cannot. It is also true that when judges are aware that their behavior is being videotaped, their behavior could well be different from non-videotaped situations.
68 Yet a prediction-oriented information policy seems to be at a loss on this issue. It cannot point toward or away from cameras in the courtroom. Yes, modelers should want to know the effect of videotaped observation compared to other environments, but their needs are unable to drive those observation policy choices. In other words, an empiricist bent on prediction will be curious about how video cameras influence judicial behavior given a diversity of cameraaccess practices or the possibility of a change in practice. If, however, the choice is made to exclude the cameras and never turn back, then an empiricist cannot muster arguments for reversing that policy. The empiricist interested in predicting judicial behavior needs to understand the relevant decision environment, not change it per se. He or she should be indifferent to which environment is selected, as long as policymakers ensure access to data needed for prediction in the chosen environment.
Contrast those who enjoy witnessing real-life courtroom dramas. Video images are central to this form of popular entertainment. There is striking anecdotal evidence of this. During criminal proceedings against Michael Jackson, cameras were not allowed inside the courtroom but transcripts were released to the public. The E! Entertainment network and British Sky Broadcasting televised professional actors performing segments of the transcripts on the day after each was released. 69 The audience for these reenactments cannot be indifferent to courtroom camera policies. Assuming a gap between popular entertainment demands and the information policy delivered by a prediction orientation, the question is how we should judge it. Is it a failing? In the setting of a symposium hosted by a respected academic institution, the gap is not likely to be of much concern. Instead, this feature of prediction orientation might assist scholars, judges, and others to specify which goals they are after when they invoke the idea of transparency. Most likely, this set of values will gravitate toward justifications involving monitoring in a democracy, the possibility of institutional reform, fair warning to potential litigants about how the system operates, a sense of legitimacy among participants in the judicial system, and perhaps the intrinsic benefits of academic inquiry. My guess is that popular entertainment will receive little or no weight. 70 Regardless of your value set, there are lively entertainment alternatives and reality television is not likely to disappear in the near future. Celebrity activity might be intriguing to mass audiences whether it happens on the red carpet or the courthouse steps.
In this space, I will not take a position on whether an instrumental and academic value set should be exclusive for the purpose of information policymaking. I will suggest, however, that many traditional transparency claims are motivated by entertainment values. This helps explain why the controversies over courtroom cameras and access to high-profile criminal proceedings are perennial issues.
Consider the well-known line of free speech doctrine addressing mass media demands for access to court proceedings and records. In many of these cases, both sides in the dispute and the trial judge preferred confidentiality to public exposure. 71 The interveners argued for constitutionally required openness, which would serve their audiences (also known as consumers). This is not to disregard the possibility that such access would shape judicial behavior in beneficial ways. Perhaps scrutiny by members of the general public would bring to bear popular norms on adjudication, and perhaps this influence deserves to be increased. 72 This type of monitoring claim is controversial but not irrational. Even so, the consumption value delivered by media access is undeniable. And fully sating this demand with a prediction-oriented information policy seems impossible.
Compare information on other aspects of judicial operations, data that are not popularly demanded. While debate over courtroom cameras never stops, outsiders do not seem to know or care exactly how hard fed- United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999) (holding that for-profit publishing company could not assert facial challenge to state law that demanded promise of noncommercial use before disclosing arrestee addresses).
71. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1984) (arising from defense-and-prosecution-supported motions to close most of voir dire and seal transcript thereof); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion) (arising from defendant's motion to close his criminal trial, which was unopposed by prosecution).
72. Some believe that a good monitoring argument can be made out for media access to the "special interest" deportation proceedings that took place after 9/ 11. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002).
[Vol. 53: p. 829 eral judges work-whether they are working close to capacity, or whether they might be made to work harder without sacrificing quality or qualified applicants. We tolerate this ignorance even though judges are tax-paid agents of the state who are employed to perform a public service. Of course a rudimentary measure of effort is available: case filings per judge. 73 But more informative measures of effort and productivity are not recorded as a matter of policy. 74 There does not appear to be readily available data on orders or opinions per judge, nor are federal judges required to keep timesheets. 75 In a related vein, we do not know the extent to which judges rely on their law clerks. Common knowledge does not isolate the number or identities ofjudges who rely on law clerk drafting, nor the extent to which each judge retains control over opinion content, nor law clerks' actual influence over case outcomes as opposed to the details of opinion content. 76 The quiet persistence of these gaps in our knowledge is telling.
CONCLUSION
This suggests two final thoughts. The first is that a prediction-oriented information policy will not cover every version of "transparency." There is fair doubt that this orientation can deliver on the instrumental value of legitimizing court outcomes, additional concern about whether efficiency monitoring will be accomplished, and very little chance that it can satisfy popular entertainment demands. The second thought is that a rational observer might not care. Shaping information policy to maximize reliable predictions about judicial behavior performs well in serving several other transparency values. The remaining shortfalls are troubling only according to certain normative perspectives. This is a fitting place to close, then. By examining the possibilities of an information policy that [Vol. 53: p. 829 caters to empirical models ofjudicial behavior, the plausible justifications forjudicial transparency have been better specified and an important normative choice has been exposed.
